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Abstract
Language maps signals onto meanings through the use of two distinct types of structure.
First, the space of meanings is discretized into categories that are shared by all users of the lan-
guage. Second, the signals employed by the language are compositional: The meaning of the
whole is a function of its parts and the way in which those parts are combined. In three iterated
learning experiments using a vast, continuous, open-ended meaning space, we explore the condi-
tions under which both structured categories and structured signals emerge ex nihilo. While previ-
ous experiments have been limited to either categorical structure in meanings or compositional
structure in signals, these experiments demonstrate that when the meaning space lacks clear preex-
isting boundaries, more subtle morphological structure that lacks straightforward compositionality
—as found in natural languages—may evolve as a solution to joint pressures from learning and
communication.
Keywords: Categorization; Communication; Compositionality; Cultural evolution; Iterated
learning; Language evolution; Sound symbolism
1. Introduction
Language facilitates the division of the world into discrete, arbitrary categories
(Lupyan, Rakison, & McClelland, 2007). For example, the words bottle, cup, flask, glass,
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and mug separate the space of drinking vessels into discrete regions based on such fea-
tures as shape, material, and function; however, languages differ in the way they dis-
cretize our continuous sensory perception of the observable world (Malt, Sloman, &
Gennari, 2003). The presence of categorical structure in language reduces an intractable,
theoretically infinite set of meanings to a tractable, finite set of words that have the flexi-
bility to handle novel exemplars (Lakoff, 1987). By aligning on a particular system of
categorical meaning distinctions, members of a linguistic population can rely on their
shared understanding of the structure of the world to successfully communicate.
A second important property of language is its compositional structure: The meaning
of a sentence—at multiple levels of analysis—is a function of the meanings of its parts
and the way in which those parts are combined. For example, the meanings of the water
is in the cup and the cup is in the water are predictable from the constituent parts (six
monomorphemic words) and the word order. In language, compositional structure is a
means for optimizing the trade-off between expressivity (the number of meanings that
can be expressed) and compressibility (the degree to which the language can be reduced
to atomic units and rules of recombination) (Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, & Smith, 2015).
This paper focuses on how these two structural properties of language (categorical and
compositional structure) can emerge simultaneously through the cultural evolutionary pro-
cesses that are argued to hold at least some explanatory power in understanding where
such structure comes from (e.g., Christiansen & Chater, 2008). Although the cultural evo-
lution of categorical (e.g., Xu, Dowman, & Griffiths, 2013) and compositional (e.g.,
Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008) structure has previously been demonstrated in isolation,
we show here that structured languages can evolve where no categories have been pro-
vided by the experimenter a priori. We show this using an open-ended meaning space
and the experimental paradigm of iterated learning.
1.1. Iterated learning
Iterated learning refers to “a process in which an individual acquires a behavior by
observing a similar behavior in another individual who acquired it in the same way”
(Kirby et al., 2008, p. 10681). For example, an individual learns a language from his or
her parents, who themselves learned the language from their own parents. Taking inspira-
tion from earlier computational (e.g., Hurford, 1989; Kirby, 2002; Smith, 2004) and
experimental (e.g., Galantucci, 2005; Horner, Whiten, Flynn, & de Waal, 2006; Selten &
Warglien, 2007) studies, Kirby et al. (2008) devised an experimental paradigm for study-
ing iterated learning using adult human learners.
The basic design of an iterated learning experiment is as follows. An artificial language
(i.e., a mapping between signals and meanings) is generated. In the case of Kirby et al.
(2008), this language was a set of 27 randomly generated strings that were mapped onto
a fixed set of 27 meanings (three shapes, in one of three colors, moving in one of three
distinct patterns). Participants learn this language in a training phase and are then asked
to reproduce the language by typing in the corresponding strings for a selection of mean-
ings. The output from this test phase is then taught to a new participant, whose test out-
J. W. Carr et al. / Cognitive Science 41 (2017) 893
put is, in turn, taught to another new participant. These experiments typically show that,
after several generations, the languages that initially started out as random evolve some
form of structure.
The simplest kind of structure that can arise from these experiments is where partici-
pants collapse all meaning distinctions. This kind of language (referred to as “degenerate”
by Kirby et al., 2015) is highly learnable because a single word can be applied to any
meaning. Similarly, systems of structure can arise where the meaning space is collapsed
into a small number of categories, each labeled by a distinct word. These kinds of struc-
ture represent one way in which languages might adapt to become easier to learn and
therefore reliably transmitted. However, while these kinds of language are highly com-
pressible, they are not expressive (see Kirby et al., 2015, for more discussion of this
trade-off).
The second experiment reported by Kirby et al. (2008) implemented a “filtering” sys-
tem that removed duplicate strings from the training material taught to the next partici-
pant in a chain, such that the training language always consisted of a set of unique
signals. This modification was intended as an analog of the pressure for expressivity that
exists in natural languages. In this experiment, small sets of meaningful, recombinable
units emerged corresponding to the dimensions of the meaning space. For example, labels
for all blue stimuli began with l- and labels for all stimuli moving in a spiral motion
ended with -pilu. By learning a handful of linguistic units and the rules for combining
them, participants were able to generate a unique label for any possible meaning combi-
nation, including meanings they had not been taught during training.
1.2. Continuous meaning spaces
Iterated learning experiments have typically relied on meaning spaces that are discrete,
finite, low dimensional, and structured by the experimenter. Kirby (2007) has described
such meaning spaces as fixed and monolithic (p. 256). For example, the meaning space
used in Kirby et al. (2008), described above, is three dimensional with each dimension
(color, shape, and motion) varying over three discrete qualities. To take another example,
the space in Smith and Wonnacott (2010) has two discrete dimensions (animal and plural-
ity) for a total of eight meanings.
More recently, iterated learning experiments have been conducted using continuous
meaning spaces (see also work with continuous signal spaces by e.g., Verhoef, 2012). Xu
et al. (2013) conducted an experiment where participants had to label a continuous color
space using between two and six color terms according to condition. The way in which a
participant discretized the space was then taught to a new participant in a chain. After 13
generations of cultural transmission, the structure of the space came to resemble the way
in which color space is typically structured by languages recorded in the World Color
Survey (Kay, Berlin, Maffi, Merrifield, & Cook, 2009). For example, in the three-term
condition, the emergent systems discretized the space into dark, light, and red categories.
Perfors and Navarro (2014) used a meaning space of squares that could vary continu-
ously in terms of color (white to black) and size (small to large). In one condition, there
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was an abrupt change in the color, such that the stimuli could be categorized into two
broad categories (light-colored squares and dark-colored squares); in another condition,
there was an abrupt change in the size of the squares. Labels for these stimuli were then
passed along a transmission chain of learners. In both conditions, the authors found that
the structure of the emergent languages came to mirror the structure of the meaning
space, primarily making color or size distinctions according to condition.
Silvey, Kirby, and Smith (2013) produced a continuous meaning space by randomly
generating four seed polygons and then gradually morphing the polygons into each other,
creating a space of 25 stimuli. The space had no obvious internal boundaries; as such,
participants showed variation in how they discretized it. The authors also conducted an
iterated learning experiment using the same meaning space (Silvey, 2014, Chapter 5). In
this experiment, each generation consisted of a pair of participants who communicated
about the stimuli using a fixed set of up to 30 words. Over five generations, the category
systems that emerged tended to make fewer distinctions and became easier to learn. Fur-
thermore, the category structures became increasingly convex, providing experimental
evidence for predictions made by G€ardenfors (2000) about semantic convexity.1
1.3. Research questions
Two important and related questions arise from prior research into iterated learning.
First, to what extent are the general findings supported under more realistic assumptions
about meaning? For example, do the results still hold when the meaning space possesses
properties that more closely reflect the natural world (e.g., high-dimensionality, open-
endedness, continuousness)? This question has been partially addressed by the work with
continuous meaning spaces described above (see also simulation work by e.g., Laskowski,
2008). The second question that arises is whether iterated learning simply returns the
structure prescribed by the experimenter, transferring it from one domain (e.g., predefined
categories in the meaning space) to another domain (e.g., the emergent structure in the
signals). Xu et al. (2013) address this issue to a certain extent; however, the participants
in their experiment are explicitly told how many categories to create—the number of cat-
egories does not arise naturally—and the participants are also likely to have strong pre-
conceptions of how to discretize color space based on the color system of their native
language (although the authors do address this); furthermore, Xu et al. (2013) do not test
for emergent signal structure, since a fixed set of labels is provided. If it is indeed the
case that iterated learning experiments simply return structure provided by the experi-
menter, is it realistic to assume that structured languages can evolve in a context where
individuals are not provided with shared categorizations of the observable world?
In this paper, we address these concerns by introducing a novel meaning space of ran-
domly generated triangle stimuli. Like previous work, our meaning space is continuous,
but crucially it is also open-ended: The structure of the space is neither provided by the
experimenter nor naturally categorizable; instead it is up to the participants to arbitrarily
decide how to categorize the space. In addition, the experiment is set up in such a way
that no two generations are tested on or trained on precisely the same stimuli, forcing
J. W. Carr et al. / Cognitive Science 41 (2017) 895
participants to generalize from the training stimuli to the test stimuli in all cases. Finally,
the space of possible stimuli that participants can encounter is vast, forcing participants
to adopt a system of categorization. Together, these properties of our meaning space rep-
resent more realistic assumptions about the natural world, and by not defining what the
meaning dimensions are, we can test whether structure can arise in the signals and in the
meaning space simultaneously.
1.4. Outline of this paper
This paper reports three artificial language learning experiments that use the paradigm
of experimental iterated leaning described above. Experiment 1 (basic transmission) looks
at what happens when there is no pressure for expressivity. It therefore provides a base-
line for how participants respond to the open-ended meaning space. The results demon-
strate that categories emerge over generational time to discretize the space of possible
triangles. Experiment 2 (transmission with an artificial expressivity pressure) explores
whether compositional structure can emerge alongside the categorization of the meaning
space by implementing an artificial pressure for expressivity. The results of this experi-
ment were negative, suggesting that the second experiment reported by Kirby et al.
(2008) may be a special case relating to the discrete meaning space adopted therein.
Experiment 3 (transmission with communication) implements a natural expressivity pres-
sure—communication—and shows that sublexical structure can emerge when languages
are both learned and used to communicate.
2. Experiment 1: Basic transmission
Our first experiment is equivalent to the first experiment reported by Kirby et al.
(2008) and looks at what happens when languages are passed along a simple transmission
chain with no pressure for expressivity. We had two hypotheses about what would hap-
pen over generational time:
1. We expect that the languages will become increasingly easy to learn.
2. We expect to find emergent categories in the meaning space.
These outcomes were expected because the languages should adapt to the cognitive biases
of the language users, gradually becoming more learnable. Categories are a way to
increase learnability because they constitute a more compressed representation of the
meaning space.
2.1. Method
The experiment adopted the standard iterated learning paradigm described previously:
Participants were arranged into transmission chains in which the output from generation i
became the input to generation i + 1 for a given chain.
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2.1.1. Participants
Forty participants (20 female) were recruited at the University of Edinburgh. The med-
ian age was 22 years (range: 19–34). Participants were paid £5.50 for participation, and a
£20 Amazon voucher was offered as a prize for the best learner. Ethical approval was
granted for all experiments reported in this paper according to the procedures of the
School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences at the University of Edin-
burgh. All participants provided informed consent and were offered debrief information.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Participants learned and produced artificial languages that consisted of labels paired
with triangles. To generate a triangle stimulus, three points were chosen at random in a
4809480-pixel space and joined together with black lines (2 pixels wide). The space was
enclosed in a 5009500-pixel dashed, gray bounding box. One vertex (determined ran-
domly) was marked with a black circle with a radius of eight pixels (referred to as the
orienting spot). Its function is to give the participant some context about which way the
triangle is oriented, although this was not explicitly explained to participants. The number
of stimuli2 that can be generated in this way is 3 480
2
3
 
 6  1015. See Fig. 1 for some
examples of the triangle stimuli. In this paper, we use the terms dynamic set and static
set to refer to subsets from the set of possible triangles that participants may be exposed
to. These terms are explained in greater detail below; for now it suffices to say that a
unique dynamic set is generated at every generation (i.e., it changes across participants
and generations), while the static set is identical for all participants across all experi-
ments, allowing us to take measurements on a consistent set of stimuli.
The labels used as input to the first generation in a chain were generated by concate-
nating 2–4 syllables at random. A syllable consisted of a consonant from the set {d, f, k,
m, p, z} and a vowel from the set {a, i, o, u} (pronounced /ɑ i oʊ u/), yielding 24 possi-
ble syllables. The labels used as input to subsequent generations were derived from the
output of the previous generation in the chain. We used the MacinTalk speech synthesizer
(Alex voice) to produce a synthesized spoken version of each label with primary stress
Fig. 1. Examples of the triangle stimuli. The stimuli are generated by randomly selecting three points inside
a dashed, gray bounding box. One vertex is marked with a black circle.
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on the penultimate syllable. The use of spoken stimuli, alongside the written stimuli,
offers a number of benefits: (a) it makes the task more engaging, (b) if frees participants
from having to consider how to pronounce or subvocalize the words, (c) it ensures that
all participants hear the words pronounced in the same way, and (d) it ensures that partic-
ipants still hear the word even if they only pay attention to the triangle stimulus and
ignore the written label. When participants introduced new characters, those characters
were assigned phonological values consistent with English orthography.
2.1.3. Procedure
Participants were assigned to one of four chains at random until the chain reached 10
generations. Participants were told that they would be learning the language of the Flat-
landers (after Abbott, 1884), a fictional life-form that has many words for triangles. The
task was explained to participants in a written brief (see Appendix S1 in the supplemen-
tary material), the contents of which were reiterated verbally. The experiment was
divided into a training phase followed by a test phase. The training phase involved learn-
ing the labels used by the previous participant. The test phase involved providing labels
for novel triangles. The experimental procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2, and each phase is
explained in the following paragraphs.
During training, participants learned the labels that the previous participant had applied
to the 48 triangles in his or her dynamic set (i.e., the unique set of stimuli generated for
the previous participant’s test phase). Each training trial lasted 5 s. On each trial, the tri-
angle was presented first, and its associated label appeared below it after a 1 s delay to
ensure that both stimuli were attended to. The synthesized form of the label was played
through headphones at the same time as the presentation of the written form. Training
was done in three blocks. In each block, the participant was exposed to the 48 items in a
Fig. 2. (Top) The participant at generation i is trained on a set of triangle stimuli paired with labels
(dynamic set i  1). He or she is then tested on two novel sets of triangles: a randomly generated set
(dynamic set i) and a set that remains constant for all participants (the static set). The labels applied to the
dynamic set become the training input to generation i + 1. (Bottom) During training, the participant sees a
series of three triangles along with their associated labels. One of the three triangles is then presented again,
and the participant is prompted to type its associated label. Feedback is then given on whether the answer
was correct.
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randomized order for a total of 144 trials. After every third trial (i.e., 16 times per block,
48 times overall), the participant was shown one of the previous three triangle stimuli
again and prompted to type its label. We refer to this as a mini test. Over the course of
training, each of the 48 items was mini-tested once. Feedback on each mini test was
given in the form of a green checkmark or a red cross according to whether the partici-
pant answered correctly. If the answer was incorrect, the correct answer was shown. The
mini tests were intended as a means for holding the participant’s attention during the
training phase.
In the test phase, participants were exposed to 96 triangle stimuli, none of which they
had seen during training, and were prompted to type the associated label for each one.
The 96 stimuli consisted of the 48 stimuli in a newly generated dynamic set (which
would go on to become the training material for the subsequent participant in the chain)
and the 48 stimuli in the static set (in randomized order). The presentation of these two
sets was interleaved. The static set comprised the same set of triangles across all partici-
pants in all experiments, allowing us to take measurements on a consistent set of stimuli.
No feedback was provided during the test phase, since there is no right or wrong answer.
2.2. Results
The results for Experiment 1 are shown in Fig. 3 and are discussed in the following
sections. The raw data and analysis are available from https://github.com/jwcarr/
flatlanders.
2.2.1. Loss of expressivity
We can estimate how expressive a language is by looking at the number of words it
contains. A language with more words is potentially capable of making more meaning
distinctions. In the initial Generation-0 input, 48 unique strings were used to label the sta-
tic set, but by Generation 10, this number decreased to 6 or 7, and in Chain D, a single
word, mika, was used to describe all triangles. These results are shown in Fig. 3A. Page’s
test (Page, 1963) revealed that this decrease in the number of unique labels was signifi-
cant (L = 1,993, m = 4, n = 11, p < .001). These results show that the languages are
becoming less expressive over time.
2.2.2. Increase in learnability
We expected to find that the languages would become increasingly learnable over time.
If a language is easy to learn, a participant’s output language should more faithfully
reproduce the rules of the input language. In other words, we would expect to find a
decrease in intergenerational transmission error over time. Intergenerational transmission
error was measured by taking the mean normalized Levenshtein edit-distance3 (Leven-
shtein, 1966) between the strings used to describe items in the static set at generation i
and the corresponding strings at generation i  1:
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148
X48
m¼1
LDðsmi ; smi1Þ
max½lenðsmi Þ; lenðsmi1Þ
; ð1Þ
where LD gives the Levenshtein edit-distance, s is a string, and m is a meaning from the
static set of 48 items. This measure of error is expressed in [0, 1], where 0 is perfect
alignment between consecutive generations. The results for transmission error are shown
Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 1. (A) Expressivity: number of unique strings in the static set. (B) Levels of
transmission error. (C) Levels of general structure. (D) Levels of sublexical structure. (E) Levels of shape-
based sound symbolism. The dotted lines in (C), (D), and (E) give the upper and lower 95% significance
levels; points lying outside of this interval are unlikely to be explained by chance. Some data points at the
end of Chain D are undefined due to the small number of unique strings.
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in Fig. 3B. Page’s test revealed that the decrease in transmission error was significant
(L = 1,514, m = 4, n = 10, p < .001), suggesting that the languages are becoming easier
to learn over time. Although transmission error may appear quite high by the final gener-
ation, this should not be surprising, since a score of 0 requires not only that consecutive
participants label the categories in the same way, but also that they infer the same cate-
gory boundaries; in natural languages, however, the boundaries between categories are
known to be fuzzy (Rosch, 1973).
2.2.3. Emergence of structure
Although the languages became less expressive, we expected to find that the words
would increasingly be used to categorize the space systematically. In a systematic lan-
guage, we would expect to find that similar labels refer to similar meanings, while dis-
similar labels refer to dissimilar meanings. Thus, to measure how structured the system
is, we correlate the dissimilarity between pairs of strings with the dissimilarity between
pairs of triangles for all n(n  1)/2 pairs. The normalized Levenshtein edit-distance was
used as a measure of dissimilarity between strings. To measure the dissimilarity between
triangles, we conducted a separate experiment in which na€ıve participants were asked to
rate the dissimilarity between pairs of triangles (see Appendix A for full details of this
experiment and Appendix S2 in the supplementary material for an alternative geometric
approach). Following previous studies (e.g., Kirby et al., 2008, 2015), the distance matri-
ces for string dissimilarity and triangle dissimilarity were correlated using the Mantel test
(Mantel, 1967), since the distances are not independent of each other making standard
parametric statistics unsuitable. The test compares the Pearson correlation for the veridi-
cal signal–meaning mapping against a distribution of Pearson correlations for permuta-
tions of the mapping, yielding a standard score (z-score). The results of this analysis are
presented in Fig. 3C. The last two generations of Chain D are undefined under this mea-
sure because there is only one word in the language. The plot shows that structure is
emerging in all chains with the exception of Chain D. Page’s test revealed a significant
increase in structure (L = 1472, m = 3, n = 11, p < .001; excluding Chain D due to miss-
ing data points).
However, this measure of structure cannot discriminate between category structure and
string-internal structure (e.g., compositionality). To test if structure was present inside the
signals, a modification was made to the measure: Rather than randomize the mapping
between signals and meanings, we randomize the mapping between the category labels
(i.e., the unique set of words in the language) and the sets of triangles they map onto,
such that the set of triangles labeled by a given word remains intact but the labels for
each category are randomly shuffled. Under this randomization method, any categorical
structure in the language remains present in the permuted mappings, so a high z-score
indicates that there must be additional structure present inside the strings themselves. The
results from this alternative approach are shown in Fig. 3D, where the majority of data
points are below the upper 95% significance level, suggesting that there is no string-inter-
nal structure in the languages of this experiment.
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To visualize the categories, the pairwise dissimilarity ratings (obtained from the na€ıve
raters; Appendix A) were passed through a multidimensional scaling (MDS) algorithm,
producing a two-dimensional representation of the meaning space.4 MDS finds an
arrangement of items in a metric space that best preserves the distances known to exist
between those items (see e.g., Borg & Groenen, 2005). The MDS solution is shown in
the plot in Fig. 4. Each dark dot represents one of the triangles in the static set; triangles
that are close together in this space were rated to be similar, and triangles that are far
apart were rated to be dissimilar. Although the dimensions of the space are somewhat
abstract, the x-axis appears to correspond to shape, while the y-axis appears to have some
correspondence with size. The space is partitioned into 48 Voronoi cells—one cell for
each triangle in the static set. Each cell encompasses all points in the space that lie closer
to the associated triangle than to any other triangle from the static set. In other words,
each Voronoi cell delimits the space of triangles that would have been labeled with the
associated string under the assumption that each item is a prototypical member of a con-
vex category (G€ardenfors, 2000).
Color is used in Fig. 4 to show information about the state of the language at Genera-
tion 10 in Chain A; similarity in color indicates similarity in word form. To determine a
Fig. 4. Categorical structure of the meaning space at Generation 10 in Chain A. The plot on the left shows
how the meaning space is discretized by the words in the language: Similarity in position represents similar-
ity in meaning; similarity in color represents similarity in word form. On the right, all triangles in the static
set are grouped by the word used to describe them (presented in the same order as the legend). Refer to the
main text for a full description and interpretation of this figure.
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color for each word, we computed the pairwise Levenshtein edit-distances between the
seven words in this particular language and derived a two-dimensional MDS solution cen-
tered on the origin. The Cartesian coordinates in this MDS space were converted to polar
coordinates and then mapped into HSV (hue, saturation, intensity value) colorimetric
space: The angular coordinate was mapped to hue and the radial coordinate (scaled in
[.5, 1] to avoid overly dark colors) was mapped to saturation; the intensity value was held
constant at 1 (see Lespinats & Fertil, 2011, for a full description of this method). The
seven words are given in the legend alongside their assigned colors. Each Voronoi cell is
colored according to the word that was used to describe its associated triangle, making it
possible to see how the space is discretized by the words. The plot is a visual approxima-
tion of the measure of structure described above: In a structured language, similar colors
will cluster into similar regions, while in an unstructured language, colors will be ran-
domly distributed across the space. The images to the right of the plot show all triangle
stimuli in the static set grouped and colored according to the word that was used to
describe them. Note that Fig. 4 combines two data sets: The structure of the meaning
space is determined by the na€ıve raters, while the color coding is determined by how the
participant at Generation 10 in Chain A labeled the triangles. Figures for all generations
in all chains can be found in Appendix S3 in the supplementary material.
Fig. 4 clearly shows that the language divides the meaning space into around five cate-
gorical regions. The center of the space (medium thin triangles) is occupied by the word
fama (light purple), with the similar word pama (dark purple) branching off into the
top-right corner (smaller thin triangles). The kazi- forms (kazizizu, kazizizui, and kazizui;
yellow–green) occupy the right-hand side of the plot and represent the extremely thin tri-
angles. Muaki (blue) mostly occupies the top left (smaller open triangles), and fod (pink)
occupies the center left (larger open triangles). With some exceptions, the five main cate-
gories tend to form single, contiguous regions (e.g., it is possible to travel between any
two examples of a fama without leaving the fama region), although the regions do not
appear to be convex (it is not always possible to travel in a straight line without passing
through another category). It is important to note, however, that the Voronoi tesselation
of MDS space only offers a two-dimensional model of participants’ underlying concep-
tual representations of the triangles and linguistic categories; the plots should therefore
not be taken as a reliable source of information about the precise structuring of the mean-
ing space.
2.2.4. The rise of sound-symbolic languages
Sound symbolism describes the phenomenon where a unit of sound goes “beyond its
linguistic function as a contrastive, non-meaning-bearing unit, to directly express some
kind of meaning” (Nuckolls, 1999, p. 228). Although we did not initially set out to test
for the emergence of sound-symbolic languages, it appeared that such patterning might
be present. For example, the word kiki (the same word used in the classic bouba/kiki
experiments; K€ohler, 1929) arose independently in several chains (Chains C and D in this
experiment and Chains E, G, and H in Experiment 2) to describe very thin or small trian-
gles. To explore the emergence of shape-based sound symbolism, we hypothesized that
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the extent to which each triangle was thin vs. equilateral would be correlated with the
presence of phonemes associated with pointy vs. round stimuli (following e.g., K€ohler,
1929; Kovic, Plunkett, & Westermann, 2010; Maurer, Pathman, & Mondloch, 2006). The
“equilateralness” of a triangle (a proxy for shape) was calculated as
a
p2=ð12 ﬃﬃﬃ3p Þ ; ð2Þ
where a is the triangle’s area and p is its perimeter.5 To measure the “roundedness” of a
string, we used the sound-symbolic correspondences described by Ahlner and Zlatev
(2010, p. 310) to divide all phonemes that occurred into three categories: “round” pho-
nemes /b d g l m n oʊ cu/, which received a score of +1, “pointy” phonemes /k p t eɪ i/,
which received a score of 1, and all other phonemes, which received a score of 0. We
then correlated the total roundedness of the strings with the equilateralness of the corre-
sponding triangles and compared this correlation to a distribution of correlations for per-
mutations of the mapping between signal and meaning to arrive at a standardized
measure of shape-based sound symbolism. The results are shown in Fig. 3E; by the final
generations, there are significant levels of shape-based sound symbolism in chains A, B,
and C.
The same analysis was conducted for size-based sound symbolism using the centroid
size6 as a measure of a triangle’s size. This measure is uncorrelated with the triangle’s
shape (Bookstein, 1991, p. 97), which is particularly important given the great amount of
overlap in phonemes associated with both shape and size. Specifically, the “bigness” of a
string was measured based on the phonemes listed in Thompson and Estes (2011, p.
2396): The “big” phonemes /b d g l m w ɑ oʊ cu/ received a score of +1 and the
“small” phonemes /k p t eɪ i/ received a score of 1. While there was an effect in some
later generations, the results were quite weak. Given the lack of a strong effect for size,
only the shape-based sound symbolism results are reported in this paper.
2.2.5. Summary of Experiment 1
The results for Experiment 1 suggest that categorical structure emerges in the lan-
guages. In Chains A, B, and C, the space of possible triangles was gradually divided into a
small number of arbitrary categories that varied across chains. In Chain D, a single word
came to stand for all triangles, which is itself a form of categorical structure—in everyday
English, for example, all three-sided, two-dimensional figures can be categorized under the
single word triangle. The small number of words that emerged in the languages by the
final generations mirrors the underspecification found in the first experiment of Kirby et al.
(2008). Categories allow for languages that are more compressed and, as such, more learn-
able. For example, the language depicted in Fig. 4 can be minimally represented by seven
words, but it is presumably capable of describing any of the 6  1015 triangles that could
have been generated. However, highly compressed languages are not necessarily useful in
the context of language use, where it is important to be able to disambiguate one referent
from a set of referents (see Kemp & Regier, 2012, for an example of this trade-off in the
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context of kinship categories). To test whether more expressive languages could evolve
under this unstructured, open-ended meaning space, we conducted two additional experi-
ments that include expressivity pressures.
3. Experiment 2: Transmission with an artificial expressivity pressure
Our second experiment tests whether artificially forcing participants to use expressive
languages results in compositional structure as a solution to maintaining both diversity of
forms and compressible (and therefore learnable) languages. We had three hypotheses:
1. We expect that the languages will become increasingly easy to learn.
2. We expect to find emergent categories in the meaning space.
3. We expect to find emergent structure in the signals (e.g., compositionality).
The addition of Hypothesis 3 to the two hypotheses of Experiment 1 was motivated by
Kirby et al. (2008), whose second experiment showed that forcing languages to remain
expressive results in emergent compositional structure. In our experiment, participants
could, for example, use a system where the first syllable (a, b, or c) denotes three sizes,
the second syllable (d or e) denotes broad or thin, and the third syllable (f, g, h, or i)
denotes the quadrant that the triangle is primarily located in. In this example, participants
would only need to learn nine linguistic units (syllables a–i) and the rules for combining
them but would be able to generate 3 9 2 9 4 = 24 distinct words, providing referential
precision at minimal cost in terms of the number of label components to be learned.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Forty participants (25 female), none of whom took part in Experiment 1, were
recruited at the University of Edinburgh. The median age was 22 years (range: 18–50).
Participants were paid £5.50 for participation, and a £20 Amazon voucher was awarded
to the best learner.
3.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that participants could not use
the same string more than three times to label test items from the dynamic set (i.e., every
other test trial). We did not impose this limitation on the static set because only the
dynamic set can lead to a runaway loss of expressivity, since the way in which this set
was labeled would be passed to the next generation. The advantage of this approach is
that participants will only encounter the expressivity pressure in half of trials. The disad-
vantage is that the static set may not be entirely representative of how the participant
responded in the dynamic set. In dynamic set trials, upon attempting to enter a word that
had previously been used three times, the participant was presented with the message
“You’ve used this word too often. Please use another word.” An additional sentence was
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added to the brief to explain that this could happen (see Appendix S1 in the supplemen-
tary material). This modification to the test procedure forces the languages to remain
expressive, since the output languages passed to the next generation must contain a mini-
mum of 48 / 3 = 16 unique strings.
3.2. Results
The results of Experiment 2 are shown in Fig. 5 and are discussed in the following
sections.
3.2.1. Expressivity
The number of unique strings used to label items in the dynamic set was not able to
collapse so dramatically. Although the pressure was only applied to the dynamic set, the
number of unique strings in the static set also remained high (as shown in Fig. 5A). The
languages thus remain more expressive than Experiment 1.
3.2.2. Learnability
Fig. 5B shows that intergenerational transmission error in Experiment 2 remained rela-
tively static. Nevertheless, the results do show a significant decrease (L = 1,415, m = 4,
n = 10, p < .001) from an average of 80% error at Generation 1 down to an average of
66% error at Generation 10.
3.2.3. Structure
Although the languages in Experiment 2 are more expressive, this did not translate into
increased levels of structure. Like Experiment 1, there is no evidence for sublexical struc-
ture (Fig. 5D); however, levels of general structure are also low (Fig. 5C), with only
Chains G and H showing marginal, albeit fragile, levels of structure. Fig. 6 shows the
state of the language at Generation 8 in Chain G. In this example, which was the most
structured language to emerge, there is a clear tendency for similar labels to cluster
together. For example, labels colored green cluster down the right-hand side, dark blues
in the top left, orange–yellows on the left-hand side, and so forth. However, the structure
of the space is not as clear cut as in the case of Experiment 1, partly due to the increased
number of words. In general, however, strong levels of categorical structure did not
develop in this experiment (as indicated by Fig. 5C), and it seems that the participants
continue to make a small number of categorical distinctions by using similar (but not nec-
essarily identical) strings to label each category. For example, although the language
shown in Fig. 6 uses 14 labels, there appear to be five broad categories (colored blue/
cyan, green, magenta, orange/yellow, red/salmon; this is not simply an artifact of color
perception as these five broad categories are also clear from the strings themselves).
3.2.4. Sound symbolism
Like Experiment 1, there are significant levels of shape-based sound symbolism emerg-
ing in some of the later generations (Fig. 5E), although the effect tends to be weaker.
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3.2.5. Summary of Experiment 2
Placing a limit on the number of times a particular word could be reused allowed the
languages to remain expressive. However, this did not translate into compositional struc-
ture as hypothesized. In fact, the substantial variation in the languages prevented many of
the participants from stabilizing on a set of reliable categories. This result is at odds with
the second experiment reported by Kirby et al. (2008), where an artificial pressure was
Fig. 5. Results of Experiment 2. (A) Expressivity: number of unique strings in the static set. (B) Levels of
transmission error. (C) Levels of general structure. (D) Levels of sublexical structure. (E) Levels of shape-
based sound symbolism. The dotted lines in (C), (D), and (E) give the upper and lower 95% significance
levels; points lying outside of this interval are unlikely to be explained by chance.
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sufficient to give rise to compositional languages. While there are many possible explana-
tions for this, one possibility is that an artificial pressure for expressivity is only sufficient
in the artificial case of a small, discrete, structured meaning space.
4. Experiment 3: Transmission with communication
The restriction imposed on Experiment 2 was artificial; although participants had to
remain expressive, there was no natural reason to use a large number of distinct strings.
In our final experiment, we replaced the artificial expressivity pressure with a more eco-
logically valid pressure: At each generation, two participants must use the language to
communicate with each other. Communication introduces a natural pressure for expressiv-
ity because, in order to maximize their communicative success, a pair of participants will
need a language that is well-adapted to the discrimination of referents in a world of trian-
gles. Our hypotheses were identical to those of Experiment 2.
Fig. 6. Categorical structure of the meaning space at Generation 8 in Chain G. The plot on the left shows
how the meaning space is discretized by the words in the language: Similarity in position represents similar-
ity in meaning; similarity in color represents similarity in word form. On the right, all triangles in the static
set are grouped by the word used to describe them.
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4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Eighty participants (63 female) were recruited at the University of Edinburgh, none of
whom took part in Experiments 1 or 2. The median age was 21 years (range: 18–37).
Participants were paid £8.50 for participation. The pair of participants who were most
successful at communicating were both awarded a £20 Amazon voucher to encourage
participants to be as communicative as possible with their partners.
4.1.2. Procedure
The task was explained to participants in a written brief (see Appendix S1 in the sup-
plementary material), the contents of which were reiterated verbally. The procedure fol-
lowed the same communication game paradigm introduced in other iterated learning
experiments (e.g., Kirby et al., 2015; Winters, Kirby, & Smith, 2015); this is illustrated
in Fig. 7. Sitting in separate booths, a pair of participants completed the same training
regimen used in Experiments 1 and 2. The training material presented to the two partici-
pants was identical and was derived from the dynamic set of the previous generation.
Once both participants had completed training, they entered a communication game in
which they took turns to play the role of director and matcher. The director was shown a
triangle stimulus on his or her screen and was asked to describe that triangle to his or her
partner. This label was then displayed on the matcher’s screen along with six triangles to
Fig. 7. (Top) The participants at generation i are individually trained on dynamic set i  1. They then com-
municate about two novel sets of triangles: a randomly generated set (dynamic set i) and a set that remains
constant for all participants (the static set). The labels applied to the dynamic set become the training input
to generation i + 1. (Bottom) During communication, the director is shown a triangle and is prompted to type
a label to describe it. The label is then displayed on the matcher’s screen along with an array of six triangles
to choose from. The matcher’s task is to click on the triangle that his or her partner is trying to communicate.
As feedback, both participants see the target triangle and the selected triangle.
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choose from (the context array). The context array contained the target triangle (in ran-
domized position) and five randomly generated distractors. The matcher’s task was to
click on the triangle that his or her partner was trying to communicate. The director and
matcher were provided with full feedback: After making a selection, the correct target in
the context array was highlighted in blue, and the director was shown the triangle that
the matcher had selected alongside the correct target. The participants were jointly
awarded 10 points for each correct match; the number of points accumulated was shown
in the bottom left corner of both screens throughout the communication game.
One of the participants (determined randomly) labeled the dynamic set and the other
labeled the static set for a total of 96 communication trials. Like the previous experi-
ments, the dynamic and static sets were labeled in alternation as the pair of participants
swapped roles. This approach means that the subsequent generation was exposed to input
from one cultural parent (the participant who labeled the dynamic set); the disadvantage
is that the static set is only representative of the participant who labeled that set.
4.2. Results
The results of Experiment 3 are shown in Fig. 8 and are discussed in the following
sections.
4.2.1. Expressivity
The expressivity results are shown in Fig. 8A. The number of unique strings is gener-
ally greater than that observed in Experiment 1, and the number of unique strings in
Chain J and the first half of Chain L is comparable to Experiment 2.
4.2.2. Learnability
The results for transmission error are shown in Fig. 8B. There is a significant decrease
(L = 1,503, m = 4, n = 10, p < .001) from an average of 80% error at Generation 1
down to an average of 50% error at Generation 10.
4.2.3. Communicative accuracy
Fig. 8C shows the number of times the communicating pair correctly identified the
target triangle out of 96 trials. The chance level of accuracy under this measure is
96 / 6 = 16 (indicated by the dotted line). All but one of the pairs scored above chance.
There was a significant increase (L = 1,321.5, m = 4, n = 10, p = .021), with later gener-
ations tending to make more correct matches. Fig. 8D shows a more fine-grained measure
of communicative accuracy: the total dissimilarity between the selected triangle and the
target triangle for all incorrect responses (dissimilarity scores were collected in a separate
experiment; see Appendix B). This gives a measure of the amount of communicative
error at each generation. There was a significant decrease (L = 1,356, m = 4, n = 10,
p = .004), which again indicates that later generations communicate more accurately.
Nevertheless, levels of communicative accuracy were quite low. The pair of participants
with the highest score was Generation 8 in Chain J (46 correct trials). That all partici-
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Fig. 8. Results of Experiment 3. (A) Expressivity: number of unique strings in the static set. (B) Levels of
transmission error. (C) Number of correct trials (the dotted line indicates chance level). (D) Communicative
error. (E) General structure. (F) Sublexical structure. (G) Shape-based sound symbolism. The dotted lines in
(E), (F), and (G) give the upper and lower 95% significance levels; points lying outside of this interval are
unlikely to be explained by chance.
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pants got less than half of trials correct indicates that the task was particularly difficult
and that there may be a ceiling on how well participants can perform, given the amount
of training they receive and the length of time they communicate for. It is also likely that
a pair of participants will not infer identical category boundaries, resulting in difficulty
classifying nonprototypical members of a given category.
4.2.4. Emergence of sublexical structure
The results for general structure are shown in Fig. 8E. Structure emerged very rapidly
and remained high over the generations (L = 1,755, m = 4, n = 11, p = .007). Further-
more, Fig. 8F reveals that sublexical structure is present in Chains J and L, peaking at
around Generation 6. To take one example, the language at Generation 6 in Chain L
comprises five main units: ba, da, fa, ma, and piku. In nearly all cases, two or three of
these units will be combined together to create a word. The way in which the words map
onto the meaning space is shown in Fig. 9. Due to the large number of words, each Voro-
noi cell in the plot has been labeled to make the system easier to comprehend.
The pattern that immediately stands out is the tendency for labels represented by
orange–yellow to cluster on the right-hand side of the plot. These triangles are labeled
with words containing piku in initial and final position. There is also a clustering of reds
and pinks corresponding to words containing piku in second or final position only. When
piku occurs only once in the word, it usually indicates triangles that are small or some-
what thin (e.g., bapiku, dapiku, fapiku, mapikuba, fadapiku). When a word begins and
ends with piku, it will usually refer to a very thin triangle with little area (e.g., piku-
fapiku, pikumapiku, pikumidpiku). In fact, the three thinnest triangles are simply labeled
pikupiku. These results suggest that reduplication, a common cross-linguistic phenomenon
(Moravcsik, 1978), may play in role in intensifying meaning, perhaps through an iconic
principle (double the piku corresponds to double the thinness; cf. Regier, 1998). Words
with da in first position usually refer to triangles which are large and open (e.g., dababa,
dabafa, damafa). However, when da occurs in second position, it often indicates that the
triangle lies on the right-hand side of the bounding box (e.g., fadaba, fadama, fadapiku,
madada, madama). Finally, words with ma in first position often correspond to triangles
whose orienting spots point to the top-left corner of the bounding box (e.g., madafa,
mafaba, mamada, mapikufa). However, these patterns are probabilistic; for each rule,
exceptions can be identified.
Perhaps more interestingly, in many words, there appear to be meaningful subparts
combined with nonmeaningful subparts. For example, the meanings of fa and ma in the
words pikufapiku and pikumapiku are unclear. These subparts may be morphological resi-
due like that found in cranberry morphs. Cranberry morphs are a class of morpheme that,
for a given language, occur in only one word; as such, it is difficult to assign meaning to
them without circular reference back to the word itself, calling into question the meaning
of the term morpheme (traditionally, the smallest unit of meaning; see Aronoff, 1976,
Chapter 2 for discussion of this issue). The classic example is the cran in the word cran-
berry, which has no independent meaning; instead it serves to distinguish cranberries
from other types of berry. Similarly, the fa and ma in pikufapiku and pikumapiku may
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express the idea, “I’m of the type piku...piku, but slightly different in a way I won’t
explicitly specify.” For instance, the fa type of piku...piku is slightly longer and thinner
than the ma type, but this correspondence does not appear to be productive across the
language as a whole.
4.2.5. Sound symbolism
Fig. 8G shows levels of shape-based sound symbolism, which are very strong and tend
to emerge early in the chains. This is likely because the pair of participants can rely on a
shared, implicit understanding of common sound-symbolic patterns to more accurately
communicate with each other.
4.2.6. Summary of Experiment 3
Introducing communication created a natural pressure for participants to be expressive.
Expressivity remained higher than Experiment 1 and comparable to Experiment 2.
Despite this, the learnability of the languages also remained high. Participants in at least
two of the chains managed the pressures for expressivity and learnability by utilizing
Fig. 9. Categorical structure of the meaning space at Generation 6 in Chain L. The plot on the left shows
how the meaning space is discretized by the words in the language: Similarity in position represents similar-
ity in meaning; similarity in color represents similarity in word form. On the right, all triangles in the static
set are grouped by the word used to describe them.
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string-internal structure that leverages the structure in the meaning space and sound-sym-
bolic associations. Thus, in this experiment, where there was a pressure to maintain the
diversity of signals due to the natural pressure from expressivity in addition to the pres-
sure for learnability associated with transmission, sublexical structure emerged in addition
to the general categorical structure observed in the previous experiments.
5. Discussion
In the Introduction, we claimed that our meaning space is a useful model of the natural
world because the space of triangles is vast, continuous, and open-ended, properties that
are present in objects that occur in the real world. For example, the vast set of items
referred to by the English word cup forms a conceptual category that has fuzzy bound-
aries with neighboring concepts, such as bowl, glass, and pitcher (Labov, 1973). The
dimensions of the conceptual space in which cups are represented may be either discrete
(e.g., the presence or absence of a handle) or continuous (e.g., its size or shape). Simi-
larly, our space of triangles potentially has both discrete (e.g., the quadrant in which the
triangle is located) and continuous (e.g., the size or rotation of the triangle) dimensions
with boundaries that are not well defined. Furthermore, our participants are unlikely to
have strong preconceptions about how the space of triangles should be discretized. While
geometrical terminology exists to describe the shape of triangles (equilateral, isosceles,
and scalene) and their angles (acute, obtuse, and right-angled), these terms are not partic-
ularly useful in the context of our experimental paradigm, since they discretize the space
of triangles based on artificial mathematical properties rather than naturally perceived fea-
tures.
In Experiment 1, the languages that emerged discretized the meaning space into a
small number of categories. Although the precise boundaries between categories varied
from one chain to the next, the categories typically encoded the shape and size of the tri-
angles; other features that could have been encoded—location or rotation in the plane—
tended to be disregarded by the participants (see also Section 2 of Appendix S2 in the
supplementary material). In fact, the na€ıve raters broadly responded to the space in the
same way, rating the dissimilarity between triangles based on their shape and size proper-
ties (as evidenced by the dimensions of the MDS space). This is congruent with Landau,
Smith, and Jones (1988), who showed that, when learning words, both children and adults
are biased toward the shape of stimuli over their color, texture, or size. The process of
collapsing categorical distinctions was taken to the extreme in one of the chains where a
single word was used for all triangles by the final two generations. The process of col-
lapsing categories is a valid strategy for maximizing compressibility (and therefore learn-
ability), but the emergent languages in Experiment 1 were not expressive and would
therefore be ill-suited to a world where one needed to reliably discriminate referents.
In Experiment 2, we placed a limit on the number of times a word could be reused,
imposing an artificial expressivity pressure on the languages. This was intended to be
equivalent to the pressure imposed in Kirby et al.’s (2008) second experiment. While the
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number of unique strings remained high in Experiment 2, there was no evidence of the
sublexical structure one would expect to find in a compositional system. In fact, the large
amount of variation within each language even prevented stabilization on a set of cate-
gories in the meaning space. This result is strikingly different from the results reported
by Kirby et al. (2008), who observed robust compositional structure under such a pres-
sure. One explanation for this could be that, when the experimenter provides participants
with a structured meaning space with unambiguous internal boundaries, single partici-
pants can simply transfer part of the meaning space structure onto the signals, cumula-
tively giving rise to compositional systems over generational time. In contrast, when
participants are presented with an unstructured meaning space, as is the case here, the
process of deriving structured signals becomes nontrivial. That being said, the artificial
pressure used here is slightly different from that used by Kirby et al. (2008): The pressure
involves direct instruction to participants—asking them to use different words when an
arbitrary limit is reached—and does not maintain a one-to-one mapping between signal
and meaning (a signal can map to up to three meanings in this experiment). The effects
of such subtle differences are unclear and could be the subject of future work.
In Experiment 3, we added communication, which acts as a natural pressure for
expressivity. In this experiment, each generation consisted of communicating participants
who had the shared goal of maximizing their communicative accuracy. To achieve this, a
language would be required that could encode a sufficient number of feature distinctions
in order for the matching participant to correctly determine the target triangle. Like
Experiment 2, expressivity remained high, but, unlike Experiment 2, the learnability of
the languages also remained comparatively high and our measure of structure revealed
that string-internal structure was present in two of the four chains. Thus, in this experi-
ment, where there was a natural pressure to maintain a diverse set of signals, sublexical
structure emerged in addition to the categorical structure observed in Experiment 1.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to describe the emergent sublexical structure as composi-
tional, at least in terms of how compositionality is traditionally defined. A standard, the-
ory-neutral definition of compositionality states that, “the meaning of a complex
expression is determined by its structure and the meanings of its constituents” (Szabo,
2013). However, in our qualitative analysis of the emergent languages, it proved difficult
to write simple grammars that could describe how to create composite strings with com-
posite meanings because many of the mappings between form and meaning were highly
probabilistic. In addition, in the exit questionnaire, many of our participants were unable
to describe how the languages worked, suggesting instead that there were weak statistical
tendencies in how form mapped onto meaning; one participant (Chain I, Generation 8,
Subject A) remarked, “I think we had vague ideas of the template for each word, but we
were pretty inconsistent.”
However, this is precisely how the lexicons of natural languages work. While polymor-
phemic words are compositional (either through inflection, washed = wash + -ed, or
derivation, happiness = happy + -ness), monomorphemic words cannot be decomposed
into smaller meaningful units. Furthermore, the extent to which polymorphemic words
are compositional is also questionable. For example, Aronoff (1976, 2007) takes the view
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that lexemes, even polymorphemic ones, are largely idiosyncratic. Sentences need to be
highly compositional to provide language with its productivity, and the production of sen-
tences is certainly a generative process, leading to combinations of words that have never
been uttered before (although cf. Wray & Perkins, 2000). In contrast, the lexicon is stored
in memory and many polymorphemic words have idiosyncratic meanings that have
drifted from the sum of the parts from which they were originally derived. Aronoff there-
fore views polymorphemic lexemes as being only weakly compositional. While Aronoff’s
position may be a radical alternative to the classic view, it provides an alternative per-
spective on compositionality (or lack thereof) at the level of the lexeme.
The second linguistic property relevant to our results is de Saussure’s (1959) arbitrari-
ness of the sign, which states that the relationship between form and meaning is arbitrary
and established only by convention among language users. In the context of language
evolution, the importance of the arbitrariness of the sign was further solidified by Hockett
(1960), who counted it among the design features of language. However, there are nota-
ble exceptions to this principle, which Cuskley and Kirby (2013) break down into con-
ventional and sensory sound symbolism.7
Conventional sound symbolism refers to correspondences between signal and meaning
that are set up by the historical relatedness of words. Such correspondences have been
shown to contribute to the overall systematicity of natural languages using corpus-analyti-
cal techniques in both English (Monaghan, Shillcock, Christiansen, & Kirby, 2014) and
Spanish (Tamariz, 2008). One example of this, which seems likely to contribute to such
statistical correspondences, is phonesthesia—the phenomenon where monomorphemic
words contain correspondences between sound and meaning. For example, English words
beginning with sn- often have meanings relating to the nose (e.g., sneeze, sniff, snore,
snout, etc.). Such words may possess shared etymologies that are obfuscated by the current
state of the language and/or may be adopted precisely because of the correspondences they
share with preexisting words in the lexicon. Bergen (2004) and Hutchins (1998) have
shown in psycholinguistic experiments that the English phonesthemes have a psychologi-
cal reality in the minds of native speakers, suggesting that they should be considered in a
similar light to regular morphemes (see Kwon & Round, 2015, for some discussion).
The second type, sensory sound symbolism, involves correspondences between signal
and meaning motivated by cross-modal or intramodal cognitive biases (see Lockwood &
Dingemanse, 2015, for a review). This type of sound symbolism is particularly relevant
to this study because it has been shown to facilitate word learning (e.g., Monaghan,
Christiansen, & Fitneva, 2011; Nielsen & Rendall, 2012; Nygaard, Cook, & Namy, 2009;
Parault & Schwanenflugel, 2006) and is frequently advanced as an explanation for the
origin of language. We found significant levels of shape-based sound symbolism in the
emergent languages. There was also some evidence for size-based sound symbolism in
some of the languages using a conservative measure of size.
Compositionality and the arbitrariness of the sign are fundamental principles of lan-
guage. However, recent research, briefly reviewed above, is suggestive of a more nuanced
picture of language structure that our results are aligned with: Sound symbolic structure
emerged in all three of our experiments, and, in Experiment 3, we found evidence of sub-
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lexical structure that was not compositional in the traditional sense. In the early genera-
tions of Experiment 3, the pairs of participants shared little common ground, so they
made use of iconic strategies, such as sound symbolism or reduplication. This gave rise
to sublexical structure that peaked in each of the chains between Generation 2 and Gener-
ation 6. This sublexical structure then gradually started to drop away, perhaps—as Aron-
off might argue—because the meanings of the words begin to drift from their
compositional origins as “the sign gravitates to the word” (Aronoff, 1976, p. 14). That is
to say, the words may be compositional early on and then start to lose this property as
they begin to evolve idiosyncratic meanings not predictable from their component parts,
just as in natural language where polymorphemic words cannot always be easily decom-
posed into smaller units of meaning.8 We suggest that this aspect of compositionality, as
well as a more complete understanding of how iterated learning builds morphemes out of
noise—via an interim stage of statistical tendencies—is ripe for future exploration.
6. Conclusion
Our meaning space pushes the boundaries on the experimental study of iterated learn-
ing by avoiding several simplifications that previous experiments have made. Our mean-
ing space is continuous, unstructured by the experimenter, vast in magnitude, and we do
not prompt participants to make a certain number of categorical distinctions. Despite
these features of the experimental setup, our first experiment showed that cultural evolu-
tion can deliver languages that categorize the meaning space under pressure from learn-
ability. These languages had no string-internal structure but showed signs of containing
sensory sound symbolic patterning. In our second experiment, and unlike previous stud-
ies, combining the pressure for learnability with an artificial pressure for expressivity did
not lead to signals with internal structure. In our final experiment, we found that combin-
ing a pressure for learnability with a pressure for expressivity derived from a genuine
communicative task gave rise to languages that use both categorization and string-internal
structure to be both learnable and expressive. Unlike previous work, this emergent struc-
ture was sublexical rather than morphosyntactic, and as such bears similarities to certain
aspects of natural lexicons, combining both conventional and sensory sound symbolism.
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Notes
1. Although we do not test these predictions in this paper, we do use the notion of
semantic convexity in our analyses. This notion states that “a subset C [i.e., a cate-
gory] of a conceptual space S [i.e., a meaning space] is said to be convex if, for all
points x and y in C, all points between x and y are also in C” (G€ardenfors, 2000, p.
69). In other words, the members of a category form a single region of a meaning
space in which it is possible to travel between any two members in a straight line
without leaving the region.
2. The number of possible triangles in a finite space is uncountably infinite given the
set of real numbers. However, the number of triangle stimuli in our meaning space
is limited by the resolution of the display and ultimately by what participants are
able to perceive as distinct. The latter is difficult to precisely quantify, but for the
purpose of this paper, the space can be assumed to be vast in magnitude.
3. The minimum number of insertions, deletions, and substitutions that must be made
to one string to transform it into another. The distance is normalized by dividing
by the length of the longer string.
4. Correlation between the original dissimilarity ratings and the corresponding Eucli-
dean distances in MDS space: .83. Stress-1 value: .25.
5. The denominator in Eq. 2 is the upper bound on the area of a triangle of given
perimeter. When the ratio is 1, the triangle has maximum area given its perimeter
and is therefore equilateral; as the ratio approaches 0, the triangle becomes increas-
ingly thin and pointed.
6. Square root of the sum of squared distances from the centroid of the triangle to its
vertices.
7. Cf. Dingemanse, Blasi, Lupyan, Christiansen, and Monaghan (2015), who refer to
these notions under the terms “systematicity” and “iconicity.”
8. For example, the meaning of reduce is not predictable from re- and -duce, despite
the fact that these morphemes appear in other English words: receive, refer, repel;
deduce, induce, produce (Aronoff, 1976). However, the Latin etymology of these
words indicates that they were indeed compositional in the past: reducere = to lead
back, referre = to carry back, repellere = to drive back, etc.
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Appendix A: Online dissimilarity rating task
To measure the dissimilarity between pairs of triangles, we conducted an online experi-
ment on the crowdsourcing platform CrowdFlower. A standard rating procedure was
adopted, which is considered to be more reliable than other, more economical methods
(Giordano et al., 2011). We collected dissimilarity ratings for the 1,128 pairs of triangles
in the static set. The pairs of stimuli were randomly divided into 8 subsets of 141 pairs.
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This was repeated 12 times, resulting in 96 subsets, each to be assigned to an individual
participant. We paid a flat rate of $0.50 for each of the 96 participants who completed
the task. To access the task, participants had to correctly answer three simple entry ques-
tions, which evaluated their ability to understand basic English instructions; anyone who
failed to answer these questions correctly was not allowed to enter the task. The partici-
pants were told that they would see pairs of triangles and would have to “rate how simi-
lar the two triangles are” using a slider control. The main part of the task was preceded
by a 1 min familiarization stage in which participants were shown all 48 triangles in the
static set to give them a sense of the maximum and minimum dissimilarity.
On each trial, the pair of triangles were presented side by side in 5009500-pixel
dashed, gray bounding boxes. The slider control was located below the triangles and was
labeled with very similar on one end and very different on the other; the direction of the
scale was determined randomly for each participant. The slider had 1,001 levels of granu-
larity, where 0 is maximally similar and 1,000 is maximally dissimilar. The participant
could not proceed to the next trial until at least 3 s had passed and the slider control had
been moved. After giving a rating, the participant had to press the enter key, which
removed the triangles and slider from the screen, and then click a button labeled next,
which was centered at the top of the screen; this forced the participant to move the
mouse cursor to the top of the screen where it would be approximately equidistant from
all points on the slider on the following trial.
There were six practice trials at the beginning of the experiment and three reliability
trials randomly interspersed among the normal trials (for a total of 150 trials). In reliabil-
ity trials, participants were shown identical triangles and should therefore have rated them
with a low dissimilarity rating; this was included to monitor participants’ reliability. Due
to a browser compatibility issue, a small portion of ratings (5.7%) were not recorded.
After excluding these ratings, an average of 11.32 (SD: 1.48) independent ratings were
collected for each pair of triangle stimuli. The median dissimilarity rating (on the 1,000-
point scale) for reliability trials was 0, suggesting that participants were attending to the
stimuli. Two participants were excluded because their mean ratings of reliability pairs
were > 100.
The remaining 94 participants’ ratings were normalized in [0, 1] such that the ratings
would use the entire width of the scale. The normalized ratings were then averaged
together to produce a mean dissimilarity rating for each pair of triangles. Individual rater
agreement was measured by correlating an individual participant’s ratings with the
corresponding mean dissimilarity ratings for the 94 participants as a whole. Mean rater
agreement was .7 (range: .22–.88). The three participants whose rater agreement was < .4
were then excluded, leaving a total of 91 participants.
The final distance matrix used in the main analysis was produced by averaging
together the normalized ratings for the final 91 participants. There was an average of
10.72 (SD: 1.55) independent ratings per pair. Interrater reliability among the 91 partici-
pants was measured using Krippendorff’s alpha coefficient (Krippendorff, 1970), which is
applicable where multiple raters each rate incomplete but overlapping subsets of the full
data set. The value of this statistic was .41, which is quite low; however, this should not
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be surprising given that participants were not instructed on specifically how to judge the
dissimilarity between triangles, so some diversity in ratings was to be expected.
Appendix B: Dissimilarity judgments between target and selected triangles in
Experiment 3
Unless otherwise noted, this online experiment was identical to that described in
Appendix A above. The 80 participants who took part in Experiment 3 selected the
wrong triangle from the context array a total of 2,653 times. For a more granular measure
of communicative error, we wanted to quantify the dissimilarity between the target and
selected triangles in each of these cases. The 2,653 pairs were randomly divided into 21
subsets (14 subsets of 126 pairs and 7 subsets of 127 pairs). This was repeated 10 times,
resulting in 210 subsets to be assigned to individual participants. We paid a flat rate of
$0.45 for each of the 184 participants who completed the task. There were six practice
trials at the beginning and three reliability trials randomly interspersed among the normal
trials (for a total of 135 or 136 trials).
The median number of independent ratings collected for each pair was 9 (range:
4–10). The median dissimilarity rating for reliability trials was 0. One participant was
excluded because they rated all triangle pairs as having maximum dissimilarity. An addi-
tional 32 participants were excluded because their mean ratings of reliability pairs were
> 100. The remaining 151 participants’ ratings were normalized and averaged together to
produce a mean dissimilarity rating for each pair of triangles. Mean rater agreement was
.69 (range: .36–.87). The three participants whose rater agreement was < .4 were then
excluded, leaving a total of 148 participants. The final dissimilarity ratings used in the
main analysis were produced by averaging together the normalized ratings given by the
final 148 participants. The mean number of independent ratings per pair of triangles was
7.04 (SD: 1.4). Krippendorff’s alpha for interrater reliability was .37.
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